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Abstract
We propose a Unified Growth model that analyzes the role of the Sci-
entific Revolution in the takeoff to sustained modern economic growth.
Basic scientific knowledge is a necessary input in the production of applied
knowledge, which, in turn, fuels productivity growth and leads to rising
incomes. Eventually, rising incomes instigate a fertility transition and a
takeoff of educational investments and human capital accumulation. In re-
gions where scientific inquiry is severely constrained (for religious reasons
or because of oppressive rulers), the takeoff to modern growth is delayed
or might not occur at all. The novel mechanism that we propose for the
latent transition towards the takeoff could contribute to our understand-
ing of why sustained growth emerged first in Europe.
JEL classification: O11, O31, O33, O41.
Keywords: Scientific Revolution, Industrial Revolution, Basic Science,
Applied Science, Takeoff to Sustained Growth, Unified Growth Theory.
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Though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist af-
terward works in a different world.
(Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970)
1 Introduction
Much has been written about causes of the Industrial Revolution, Europe’s little
divergence and the great divergence between Europe and the rest of the world
in the 19th century. Although it is widely accepted that the explanation for
Britain’s success must come from understanding the development and improve-
ment of new technologies, researchers differ on the reasons why Britain and
Europe were more successful than others. Central in this debate is the disputed
role of science. Strong support for an early significant impact of science comes
from Jacob (2014). She pleads to focus on the complexities of science-based
technological change. Or more precisely, on those inventions that could not have
been developed without knowledge of Isaac Newton’s laws of motion, the law
of universal gravitation, and the subsequent research on vacuums in the 17th
century (see also Rosen, 2010).1 Moreover, Mokyr (2002) stresses that the En-
lightenment had a dual impact on the first Industrial Revolution both because
it was conducive to the production of more useful knowledge, while at the same
time reducing access costs by improving incentive structures and promoting bet-
ter economic policy and institutions. For example, the “Republic of Letters”, a
group of scientists and intellectuals who discussed and shared ideas intensively,
changed the way of knowledge dissemination and finally led to the establishment
of the first journals (Mokyr, 2016).
Critics of a causal relationship mainly refer to the textile sector, where nearly
all important innovations such as the spinning jenny, the waterframe, and the
moule were invented by rather uneducated inventors with high creativity who de-
veloped the machines through a learning-by-doing process in a relatively isolated
scientific environment. Mokyr suggests that despite some important inventions
only generating a one-shot increase in productivity that did not translate into
sustained growth, applied knowledge increased nonetheless, which allowed con-
tinuous inventions to follow (see Allen, 2011). Although Allen sees the role of
1The debate already flourished in the 1960s and centered around Musson and Robinson
(1989), who pointed out that the inventions of the Industrial Revolution need more than just
“unlettered empiricism” (O´ Gra´da, 2016, 225).
2
relative factor prices as most important for the success of British innovations, he
agrees with Mokyr that the inventions of the Industrial Revolution have led to
processes that changed the economy sustainably and made further technological
developments possible. Even though numerous differing opinions on the actual
impact of science on the early industrial take-off exist, there seems to be a gen-
eral agreement that scientific knowledge accumulated over time and was most
important for sustained economic growth from the 1850s onward. This is also
supported by recent research of Cinnirella and Streb (2017). They have shown
for Prussia that the second Industrial Revolution can be seen as the transition
period for the role of human capital. Whereas in the first Industrial Revolution,
useful knowledge of a small group of educated inventors was related to innovation
and growth, in the subsequent twentieth century, the quality of basic education
was important for worker’s productivity and R&D processes.
The Unified Growth Theory as developed in the seminal works of Galor
and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005, 2011)2 led to a better understanding among
economists on the mechanisms that triggered the escape from the Malthusian
trap, resulting in the Industrial Revolution and in the takeoff toward sustained
modern economic growth. This strand of literature usually emphasizes the
quality-quantity tradeoff that affects the size and the education of the labor
force and, with it, the rate at which new ideas are developed. What these mod-
els do not consider is the above explained scientific basis that is necessary for
productive applied R&D to take place. Prettner and Werner (2016) include a
basic scientific research sector in an R&D-based growth framework along the
lines of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995)3 and analyze the extent to which basic
research influences modern economic growth. However, Prettner and Werner
(2016) do not focus on the interactions between basic scientific research and
applied research over the very long run and how these interactions facilitate a
takeoff toward the phase of sustained economic growth.
We aim at contributing to the literature by analyzing the extent to which the
Scientific Revolution could have influenced the following escape from Malthusian
2Other prominent contributions include the works of Jones (2001), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz
(2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Galor and Moav (2002, 2004, 2006), Doepke (2004),
Cervellati and Sunde (2005, 2011), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), Galor et al. (2009), and Strulik
et al. (2013).
3For a non-exhaustive list of contributions in endogenous, semi-endogenous, and Schum-
peterian growth theory, see, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991), Kortum (1997),
Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Peretto (1998), Segerstro¨m (1998), Young (1998), Howitt
(1999), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001), Strulik (2005), Bucci (2008), Peretto and Saeter (2013),
Strulik et al. (2013), and Prettner (2014).
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stagnation. We do this by merging the two strands of Unified Growth Theory and
R&D-based endogenous growth theory with both basic scientific knowledge and
applied patentable knowledge. As is standard in the Unified Growth literature,
the model features utility-maximizing households with a quality-quantity tradeoff
regarding the number of children and the children’s education. An increase
in income over time leads the economy up to a point at which investments in
education become positive and a fertility transition sets in (see, for example,
Strulik et al., 2013). The associated increase in human capital accumulation is
then one of the central divers of the takeoff toward sustained economic growth.
In contrast to the standard Unified Growth literature, however, there is an
additional engine for the takeoff toward sustained economic growth, which pro-
vides the basis for the rise in the income level that leads to the fertility transition
in the first place. This second driving force is represented by the evolution of
the stock of basic scientific knowledge, which is a necessary input in the pro-
duction of applied knowledge in a purposeful applied R&D sector (Romer, 1990;
Jones, 1995). Applied R&D only becomes profitable and operative once large
enough stocks of basic scientific knowledge and human capital in a society exist.
Only then does the applied research sector start to produce the patents that are
needed in the intermediate goods sector to produce the differentiated machines
that are, in turn, required in the final goods sector to produce the consumption
aggregate. The more basic scientific knowledge exists, the more productive is
applied R&D and the earlier the takeoff to sustained growth can occur.
The structure of our model makes clear that the takeoff of applied R&D
is a central driver of long-run economic development that enables the fertility
transition later on. To avoid inconsistencies, we abstract from technological
advancements during the early phase of the Industrial Revolution. The reason is
that implementing an additional R&D sector that solely builds up on the existing
stock of applied knowledge and disregards science would complicate the model
substantially, while providing little insights on the role of science and human
capital for the economic takeoff.
Overall, our approach fits the historical evidence that over time British en-
dowment of science-based knowledge was growing, but only during the second
Industrial Revolution (1850s), when steam and coal occupied center stage, this
basic knowledge mattered. The sustained takeoff in applied R&D, however, can-
not occur if there is no basic scientific knowledge base in the economy. This
mechanism is our proposed formal modeling of the contribution of the Scien-
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tific Revolution as a major trigger of the second Industrial Revolution and the
takeoff to modern economic growth as described by Wootton (2015) and Mokyr
(2016). We believe that the suggested novel approach enables a more sophis-
ticated understanding of the growth process over the very long run and of the
economic importance of the interaction between the basic scientific knowledge
stock of a society and the accumulation of applied knowledge in the transition
from stagnation to sustained long-run economic progress. As such, our frame-
work may provide an explanation why Britain/Europe was first, if we assume
that the speed of accumulation of as well as the proximity to scientific knowledge
was determined by the Enlightenment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic model
assumptions, the structure of the household side, and the properties of the pro-
duction side of the economy. In Section 3, we derive the balanced growth path
analytically. In Section 4, we present the model simulation and discuss com-
parative statics with regards to the timing of the Scientific Revolution and its
effect on the timing of the later Industrial Revolution. Finally, in Section 5, we
summarize our findings and provide suggestions for future research.
2 The model
In this section, we describe the basic knowledge-driven growth framework in the
vein of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) into which we incorporate an endoge-
nous fertility-education decision (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Galor and Weil, 2000;
Strulik et al., 2013) and a basic science sector that deciphers the laws of nature
and lays the foundations for applied knowledge creation (Prettner and Werner,
2016).
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a small open economy that is populated by three overlapping gener-
ations: children, adults, and retirees. Children receive consumption from their
parents and retirees consume out of their savings accumulated in adulthood. At
the end of old-age, individuals die with certainty.4 We conceptualize adults as
4For simplicity, we abstract from pension schemes and from a changing life expectancy
because pension schemes are rather a 20th century development (Boersch-Supan and Wilke,
2004) and the implementation of endogenous life expectancy would complicate the model with-
out altering the central results (for a Unified Growth Model that takes changing mortality into
account, see Cervellati and Sunde, 2005).
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single-sex parents5 that make all economically relevant decisions on i) consump-
tion during adulthood and old-age, ii) the number of their children, and iii) the
education investments in each child. The resulting consumption-saving decision
impacts on intermediate goods production and thereby on the incentives to de-
velop new blueprints in applied R&D. A necessary input in applied R&D is a
basic understanding of the laws of nature, of scientific inquiry, and of the way to
disseminate new insights. This knowledge is generated in a basic scientific sector
by thinkers who decipher how nature works. The better a society’s understand-
ing of the laws of nature, of scientific inquiry, and of knowledge dissemination
is, the more productive is applied R&D. Since applied R&D is one of the main
drivers of long-run economic growth, basic scientific knowledge acts as a catalyst
of the takeoff to sustained economic growth.
The fertility decision of adults determines the evolution of the population
size, whereas the education decision determines individual human capital accu-
mulation. There is a quality-quantity tradeoff of parents in the sense that they
can increase the number of their children but at the expense of lower investments
in the education of each child (and vice versa). For low levels of economic devel-
opment, education investments are a luxury good and parents find it optimal to
choose the corner solution of no education and high fertility. Once income sur-
passes a certain threshold, investment in children’s education becomes positive,
which triggers a quality-quantity substitution of increasing education investments
and falling fertility during the transition to the modern growth regime. As in
standard Unified Growth models, this is another main engine for the takeoff to
sustained economic growth.
2.2 Consumption side
Individuals derive utility from consumption during adulthood, ct, from consump-
tion during retirement, ct+1 = st(1 + r¯), where st are savings and r¯ is the rate
of return, from having children, nt, and from the education investments in their
children, et.
6 For simplicity, we assume a small open economy such that the
5The assumption of single-sex adults is made to abstract from modeling intra-family bar-
gaining processes, which allows us to focus on the macroeconomic effects. For contributions
that investigate the intra-household decision process in more detail see, for example, de la Croix
and Vander Donckt (2010), Bloom et al. (2015), Prettner and Strulik (2017), and Doepke and
Kindermann (2019).
6Following Strulik et al. (2013) we adopt this short-cut formulation in which children’s
education enters the utility function directly. This can be justified by a “warm glow” motive of
giving (cf. Andreoni, 1989) and leads to similar tradeoffs as in the literature in which children’s
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capital rental rate is determined on the world market. Utility is logarithmic and
determined according to the following function
ut = log(ct) + β log[st · (1 + r¯)] + ξ log(nt) + θ log(et + e¯), (1)
where β refers to individual impatience7, ξ represents the preferences of parents
for the number of children, and θ the preferences of parents for children’s ed-
ucation. The parameter e¯ represents a minimum informal education level that
children acquire through observation and learning-by-doing even if parents do
not invest in the education of their children at all (see Strulik et al., 2013). This
parameter ensures that education is a luxury good and it does not pay off for
poor societies to invest in formal education. Thus, our formulation captures the
situation in agrarian pre-industrial societies—in which children mainly learned
by working alongside their parents and peers on the fields—rather well.
The lifetime budget constraint is given by
(1− ψnt)wtht = ct + st + ηetnt, (2)
where wt is the wage rate per unit of human capital, ht. The price of a unit of
education is given by η, whereas ψ denotes the fraction of parental time that
raising a child requires (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011). The product
wtht is labor income per worker for a given level of individual human capital and
1−ψnt represents the labor force participation rate. Individuals save st of their
wage income for old-age consumption. The reminder is spent on consumption
during adulthood, ct, and on children’s education, ηetnt. Expenditures on ed-
ucation depend, in turn, on the cost of each unit of education, η, the quantity
of education, et, and the number of children, nt. Overall, this setting implies a
quality-quantity tradeoff: on the one hand, more children increase utility; on the
other hand, more children decrease the amount of resources that can be devoted
to the education of each child.8
human capital or children’s income appear in the parental utility function instead of children’s
education. However, the analytical solution can be much easier obtained with the short-cut
formulation.
7The parameter β induces a similar individual behavior as a probability to die between
adulthood and old age. Thus, a small β can also be interpreted as having a relatively short
retirement phase, which fits well to most of human history (Chakraborty, 2004; Baldanzi et al.,
2019b).
8If, instead, the costs of fertility were given by a fixed amount of resources, fertility would
increase perpetually with rising income, which is counterfactual. Since, in this case, educa-
tion also rises with income, the quality-quantity tradeoff that is established theoretically and
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Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the following optimality conditions for
consumption, savings, fertility, and education
ct =
wtht
1 + β + ξ
, nt =
(ξ − θ)htwt
(1 + β + ξ)(ψhtwt − ηe¯) ,
et =
θψhtwt − ξηe¯
η(ξ − θ) , st =
βwtht
1 + β + ξ
.
As is intuitive, consumption and savings increase with income, while consumption
decreases with the discount factor and savings increase with the discount factor.
In addition, we observe that fertility stays constant in the long-run limit even for
rising income, which is in line with the literature (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor,
2005, 2011; Strulik et al., 2013). For fertility to be positive, ξ > θ and htwt >
ηe¯/ψ have to hold. These parameter restrictions are reasonable because they
rule out the situation in which parents would want to invest in the education of
their children before choosing to have children at all. In addition, the parameter
restrictions ensure a minimum level of income that is needed for positive fertility
(i.e., to prevent the population from becoming extinct in the next generation).
Education investments cannot be negative such that the possibility of a corner
solution emerges for low income levels as follows:
et =
0 for wtht < ξηe¯/θψθψhtwt−ξηe¯
η(ξ−θ) otherwise.
Altogether, parents only invest in the education of their children after wage
income has surpassed the threshold ξηe¯/θψ.
2.3 Human capital
Children’s education determines the next generation’s level of human capital
when the children of the previous period become adults and supply their time
on the labor market. To derive adult’s human capital, we set the parental ex-
penditures on education equal to the costs of education (the salaries of teachers)
and isolate the implied employment level of teaching personnel. Aggregate ed-
ucational expenditures of parents are given by ηetntLt, where Lt is the number
of workers/households in period t. Thus, aggregate educational expenditures
amount to education expenditures per child (η · et), multiplied by the number of
empirically (Li and Zhang, 2007; Galor, 2011; Fernihough, 2017) would vanish.
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children (nt), and aggregated over all households that invest in education (Lt).
The costs of education are the wages of teachers given by HEt wt, with H
E
t being
the aggregate human capital employed in education. Equating educational ex-
penditures with educational costs and solving for human capital employment in
the schooling sector yields
HEt =
ηetntLt
wt
.
Assuming that the human capital of the next generation depends on the
educational resources invested in each child and denoting the productivity of
teachers by µ, individual human capital at time t+ 1 pins down to
ht+1 =
µHEt
Lt+1
+ e¯.
In this expression, µHEt refers to the provision of economy-wide schooling. Divid-
ing economy-wide schooling by the number of pupils in period t (i.e., the number
of adults in period t + 1), yields educational resources devoted to each child,
which represents the quality of schooling. In case of a poor economy with a low
income level, education expenditures are zero and no teachers are employed in
the economy. Pupils would then solely learn by observing their parents and peers
such that individual human capital stayed equal to the costless informal educa-
tion that each child obtains, e¯. This is the situation in the era of the Malthusian
stagnation.
2.4 Production side
Apart from education, there are four sectors, the final goods sector, the inter-
mediate goods sector, the applied R&D sector, and the basic scientific research
sector. The aggregate final good is produced under perfect competition using
workers and an intermediate good as inputs. The intermediate good, in turn,
is produced under Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition using one
unit of final output to produce one unit of the intermediate good, xt (cf. Aghion
and Howitt, 2009). For the monopolist to produce the intermediate good, a
blueprint needs to be bought from the applied research sector. The necessary
funds are collected by issuing shares that can be purchased using household’s
savings. For simplicity, we abstract from physical capital in the production pro-
cess. Its inclusion would not alter our main findings but it would complicate the
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model substantially (see also Galor and Weil, 2000).
The accumulation of applied knowledge (in the form of patents/blueprints)
follows Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) after the takeoff to modern economic
growth occurred. Applied knowledge is produced in a purposeful R&D sector in
which profit-driven intermediate goods producers invest in the creation of the new
patents/blueprints to derive a stream of profits via the associated monopolistic
competition with other firms. We augment this setting by a basic science sector
that deciphers the laws of nature and invents the methods of scientific inquiry.
The stock of accumulated knowledge in this sector provides the basis for applied
research. Since the laws of nature and the way of performing science cannot be
patented, the output of this sector is non-excludable and this sector is not profit-
driven. The ideas that are generated in this sector are non-rival such that their
use by one scientist in applied research does not impinge on the productivity of
the idea when other applied scientists use them.
We conceptualize the non-excludability of the results of scientific inquiry in
the sense that great minds are either i) intrinsically motivated to think about
how nature works or ii) that they do it because it raises a thinker’s reputation
among her peers. In modern times, basic research is typically funded by gov-
ernments and conducted in research institutes and universities.9 Since we do
not want to overburden our model, we abstract from the public financing of
modern basic science and focus on the potential way how basic scientific discov-
eries could historically have occurred and contributed to the takeoff to modern
knowledge-based economic growth. The underlying assumption is that the num-
ber of eureka moments increases with the size of the population (Kremer, 1993)
and with its education level (Strulik et al., 2013). Scientists might also form so-
cieties/journals to disseminate their thoughts and ideas such that the knowledge
they create diffuses to other parts of society and can be used by the scientists
in the applied research sector to create new patents/blueprints (Mokyr, 2002,
2005, 2016; Wootton, 2015). More generally, the output that this sector pro-
duces could be thought to comprise everything that makes it easier to discover
new technologies and accumulate more basic and applied knowledge. In that
sense, the output of the basic scientific sector can be interpreted as an important
part of the Culture of Growth (Mokyr, 2016) that is necessary for a society to
engage in the creation of new ideas and thereby to foster progress (Wootton,
9For the modeling of a modern basic research sector along these lines, see, for example,
Gersbach et al. (2012), Gersbach and Schneider (2015), Akcigit et al. (2013), Prettner and
Werner (2016), and Gersbach et al. (2018).
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2015).
The aggregate final good is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function
Yt = (H
Y
t )
1−α
At∑
i=1
(xit)
α,
where HY is human capital employed in final goods production (i.e., the stock of
knowledge of workers in the final goods sector), xi is the amount of intermediate
good i used in production, α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of final output with respect
to the employment of intermediate goods, and At refers to the stock of blueprints
available in period t. Thus, there are At different intermediate goods used in the
production of the final good.
Perfect competition ensures that all production factors are paid their marginal
value products. The wage per unit of human capital of final goods producers and
the price of intermediate good i are therefore given by
wYt = (1− α)
Yt
HYt
,
pY,it = α
(
HYt
)1−α (
xit
)α−1
.
Using the second expression, the profit function in the intermediate goods sector
i becomes
pix,it = p
Y,i
t x
i
t − xit.
Because the intermediate goods producer utilizes a one-for-one technology, the
costs of production are equal to the amount of final output employed in the
production process. Profit maximization then leads to the optimal pricing rule
pit =
1
α
.
In the standard Romer (1990) framework, the price of intermediate good i ad-
ditionally depends on the capital rental rate. Since we abstract from any sort of
physical capital in our model economy, the capital rental rate drops out in the
pricing decision of intermediate goods producers. The mark-up of the monopolist
only depends on the elasticity of final output with respect to intermediates. An
immediate implication is that all intermediate goods producers charge the same
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mark-up over the price that obtains in a perfectly competitive market such that
prices do not depend on the variety i anymore. The total quantity of intermediate
goods produced pins down to
xt = H
Y
t α
2
1−α .
Aggregate output, operating profits in the intermediate goods sector, and the
wage rate per unit of human capital in the final goods sector thus simplify to
Yt = At
(
HYt
) 2α
1−α ,
pixt =
1− α
α
α
2
1−αHYt ,
wYt = (1− α)Atα
2α
1−α .
The applied research sector follows Prettner and Werner (2016). The stock
of patents increases according to the production function
At+1 − At = δAχt Bσt HAt ,
where—as in Romer (1990) and Jones (1995)—the development of new ideas
depends on the stock of already existing ideas, At, on the amount of human
capital employed in applied research, HAt , and on the productivity of scientists
in this sector, δ. To analyze the effect of the Scientific Revolution, we also in-
clude basic scientific knowledge, Bt, as a necessary input for applied knowledge
production. In this setting, χ measures the extent of intertemporal knowledge
spillovers (standing on shoulders externality) in the production of applied knowl-
edge, while σ measures the extent of intersectoral knowledge spillovers from basic
scientific knowledge to applied research. To focus on a meaningful economic so-
lution, human capital employed in R&D (HAt ) needs to be non-negative. Thus,
the stock of ideas cannot decrease over time.
Already from this formulation, the importance of the Scientific Revolution
for the Industrial Revolution becomes obvious. Overall productivity of applied
research is given by δAχt B
σ
t , which determines the profitability of this sector and
the amount of labor that it employs. Without any knowledge of the laws of
nature, or, for that matter, with a culture that does not foster scientific inquiry,
applied scientists are unproductive and new blueprints/patents cannot be dis-
covered. As a consequence, no applied scientists are employed by firms, which
reduces the frequency at which new ideas are developed to zero. This approx-
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imates, from a formal perspective, the historical state of economies before the
Scientific Revolution (Wootton, 2015). Nature is still arcane and profit-driven
R&D is non-existent.
Once this state is overcome and a positive stock of basic scientific knowledge
exists, applied knowledge production becomes feasible. In more recent times,
applied R&D firms maximize their profits
piAt = p
A
t δA
χ
t B
σ
t H
A
t − wAt HAt ,
where the first term on the right-hand side is the revenue of selling ideas at the
price pAt and the second term is the cost of employing human capital H
A
t at the
going wage wAt per unit of human capital. Maximizing profits with respect to
the employment of applied scientists, HAt , yields the following relation between
wages of applied researchers and their effective productivity
wAt = p
A
t δA
χ
t B
σ
t .
Clearly, if applied R&D firms can charge higher prices, pAt , for the blueprints
that they sell, the wages of applied scientists are higher such that this sector
could attract more employees and, thus, produce more ideas. If scientists were
more productive (δ were higher), a similar argument held true and employment
of applied scientists and thereby technological progress would be faster. Finally,
a greater stock of basic scientific knowledge Bt also fosters applied research pro-
ductivity and leads to faster technological progress and faster economic growth.
As argued above, if Bt = 0 holds, then the wages of applied scientists were
zero and no technological progress would take place. As the stock of basic scien-
tific knowledge increases, (Bt−Bt−1 > 0), the productivity of applied knowledge
creation rises gradually, such that wages and employment of applied scientists
also rise. This, in turn, fosters technological progress and economic growth and
catalyzes a takeoff toward sustained knowledge-driven economic development.
Labor market clearing implies that the wage rates of workers in the final goods
sector and those of scientists in the applied research sector equalize. Considering
that prices of patents, pAt , are paid for by operating profits, pi
x
t /(1 + r¯), the
amount of human capital employed in final goods production is given by
HYt =
(1 + r¯)A1−χt
αδBσt
.
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Turning to the basic scientific research sector, the knowledge base increases
according to the production function
Bt+1 −Bt = κHλt ,
where, unlike in the applied research sector, deciphering the laws of nature is
not compensated.10 We follow Kremer (1993) and Strulik et al. (2013) in the
assumption that the discovery of new basic scientific knowledge depends on the
overall number of thinkers in the economy and on their education, i.e., on the
stock of aggregate human capital. We also include a stepping-on-toes externality
as represented by the inverse of λ, to account for potential duplication of research
effort as in Jones (1995). Finally, κ is the productivity in the basic science sector.
A situation in which κ = 0 could be interpreted as capturing a society in which
religion or oppressive institutional settings prevent scientific inquiry. Thus, in
the words of Mokyr (2016), the “Culture of Growth” would be absent.
Putting all the information together, we arrive at the following system of
equations that fully describes the evolution of our model economy over time
At+1 = At + δA
χ
t B
σ
t H
A
t , (3)
Bt+1 = Bt + κH
λ
t , (4)
ht+1 =
µHEt
nt
+ e¯, (5)
nt+1 =
(ξ − θ)wt+1ht+1
(1 + β + ξ)(ψwt+1ht+1 − ηe¯) , (6)
Lt+1 = ntLt, (7)
wt+1 = (1− α)At+1α 2α1−α , (8)
HYt+1 =
(1 + r¯)A1−χt+1
αδBσt+1
, (9)
HEt+1 =
ηLt+1nt+1
wt+1
θψwt+1ht+1 − ξηe¯
η(ξ − θ) , (10)
HAt+1 = (1− ψnt+1)ht+1Lt+1 −HYt+1 −HEt+1, (11)
yt+1 =
α
2α
1−αAt+1H
Y
t+1
Lt+1
. (12)
10As argued above, introducing compensation of basic scientific knowledge creation via public
funding and taxes is possible but it complicates the model substantially without leading to
new insights. For the workings of the model for a modern economy in which basic scientific
knowledge is created in publicly funded universities and research facilities see Prettner and
Werner (2016). However, these authors are silent on the takeoff to modern economic growth,
on the Scientific Revolution, and on the Unified Growth setting.
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Here, Equation (3) refers to the equilibrium evolution of the stock of applied
knowledge that is needed for the production of differentiated intermediate goods
that are, in turn, used in the production of final output. Equation (4) refers to
the evolution of the stock of basic scientific knowledge that is an essential input in
the production of applied knowledge and lays the foundation for a takeoff toward
modern knowledge-based economic growth. Equation (5) describes the evolution
of individual human capital depending on the knowledge that children acquire by
observing their parents and peers and by the purposeful education investments
of parents. The latter only become positive once an economy has surpassed
a certain income threshold, facilitating the takeoff toward sustained economic
growth. Equation (6) refers to the fertility choice of households that determines
population growth. In line with empirical observations, fertility decreases after
a certain stage of economic development is reached and then converges to a
lower but positive level. Equation (7) captures the evolution of the workforce.
Equation (8) delivers the wage rate per unit of human capital that increases
with the stock of applied knowledge in the economy. Equations (9)–(11) express
employment of human capital in final goods production, education, and R&D,
respectively. Finally, Equation (12) denotes per capita GDP that rises with the
stock of applied knowledge and with average human capital of the population.
Thus, this expression features both of the driving forces of modern economic
growth and it is clear that, as long as neither At nor ht grow, there cannot be
any sustained increase in per capita income.
In the next section, we use this system to derive the balanced growth path
(BGP) analytically. Afterwards, we solve the model numerically to analyze the
extent to which basic scientific knowledge drives the takeoff toward sustained
long-run growth.
3 The long-run balanced growth path
In the following, we denote the growth rate of a variable x between periods t and
t + 1 by gx,t = (xt+1 − xt)/xt. Along the BGP, the growth rates of all variables
and the employment shares remain constant. We observe that positive growth
implies ever rising incomes (limt→∞wtht =∞), such that fertility and education
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investments along the BGP are equal to
n =
ξ − θ
(1 + β + ξ)ψ
, (13)
et =
θψhtwt
η(ξ − θ) . (14)
Along the BGP, fertility is constant and education is growing with ht · wt. Con-
sidering that consumption, ct, and savings, st, also grow with ht · wt, the BGP
growth rates of individual human capital and of the wage rate need to be deter-
mined. The evolution of individual human capital follows the equation
ht+1 =
µηetntLt
wtLt+1
+ e¯.
Substituting et from Equation (14) and using that Lt+1/Lt = nt, we arrive at
ht+1 =
µθψht
ξ − θ + e¯. (15)
Along the BGP, e¯ becomes negligibly small compared with formal schooling as
represented by the first term in Equation (15). Therefore, the BGP growth rate
of individual human capital can be expressed as
gh =
µθψ
ξ − θ − 1. (16)
Wage growth solely depends on growth in productive ideas as we know from
Equation (8). From Equation (3) we get
gA,t =
δBσt H
A
t
A1−χt
. (17)
By definition, the growth rate of A must be constant along the BGP, i.e., we
have that gA,t = gA,t+1 holds for all t. This occurs if
gA,t =
(
Bt+1
Bt
) σ
1−χ
(
HAt+1
HAt
) 1
1−χ
− 1, (18)
is fulfilled such that the numerator and the denominator of Equation (17) grow
at the same rate. In addition, also the growth rate of B must be constant, i.e.,
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we must have gB,t = gB,t+1, which holds for
Bt+1
Bt
=
(
Ht+1
Ht
)λ
. (19)
Next, we derive the expression Ht+1/Ht in Equation (19) by substituting for
aggregate human capital, using that fertility is constant along the BGP, and
taking advantage of Equation (16)
Ht+1
Ht
=
Lt+1ht+1
Ltht
= n
µθψ
ξ − θ . (20)
Inserting Equation (20) into Equation (19), the growth factor of scientific knowl-
edge along the BGP becomes
Bt+1
Bt
=
(
n
µθψ
ξ − θ
)λ
. (21)
Finally, the BGP expression for HAt+1/H
A
t has to be determined. Along the
BGP, the share of human capital in applied research is constant. Therefore,
gHA = gH has to hold, which implies
HAt+1
HAt
=
Ht+1
Ht
. (22)
Using equations (20), (21), and (22) in Equation (18), the growth rate of applied
knowledge along the BGP follows as
gA =
(
n
µθψ
ξ − θ
) 1+λσ
1−χ
− 1.
Substituting in the fertility rate from Equation (13), we finally arrive at the long
run BGP growth rate in the modern growth regime:
gA =
(
θµ
1 + β + ξ
) 1+λσ
1−χ
− 1. (23)
From this expression, a number of intuitive results that are in line with the
standard literature (cf. Strulik et al., 2013; Prettner and Werner, 2016; Baldanzi
et al., 2019a) follow. The preference parameter for education, θ, raises individual
human capital accumulation of the next generation and reduces fertility, whereas
the reverse holds true for the preference parameter for the number of children,
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ξ. In line with Strulik et al. (2013), the negative effect of decreasing fertility on
aggregate human capital accumulation is overcompensated by the positive effect
of accumulating human capital faster. The reason is that a decline in fertility
sets free additional resources via the budget constraint that can be used to invest
in education. Thus, economic growth increases with θ and decreases with ξ.
There is an additional positive effect represented by µ, which is the productivity
of teachers. If teachers are more productive, then, for a given investment in
education, human capital accumulates faster. This does not affect fertility and
only raises human capital accumulation. Thus, technological progress and income
growth increase. We summarize these effects in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
i) An increase in education investments and a decline in fertility as triggered
by an increase in the parameter θ or a decrease in the parameter ξ un-
ambiguously raise long-run economic growth because the positive effects
of greater education investments on aggregate human capital accumulation
outweigh the negative effects of lower fertility.
ii) An increase in teaching productivity, µ, unambiguously raises long-run eco-
nomic growth.
On top of these results, the long-run growth rate increases with the standing
on shoulders effect, λ, because it determines the rate at which basic scientific
knowledge accumulates and the long-run growth rate increases with intersectoral
knowledge spillovers, σ, because they increase the importance of basic scientific
knowledge in the production of new patents. Both of these effects increase the
productivity of human capital employed in applied research and thereby raise
the rate at which new patents are developed. This, in turn, raises final goods
production and income growth. We summarize these results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. For χ < 1, long-run economic growth increases unambiguously
with faster accumulation of basic scientific knowledge as represented by the terms
λ and σ. Thus, basic scientific knowledge is an important driver of economic
prosperity.
This proposition shows the importance of basic scientific knowledge for long-
run economic growth in the modern regime. Irrespective of the assumption
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χ < 1, which usually implies that long-run growth is only a function of popula-
tion growth (as in Jones, 1995), our result shows that basic scientific knowledge
accumulation and education attain crucial roles in determining economic pros-
perity.
4 Simulation
4.1 Data
The simulation resembles developments of total factor productivity (TFP), basic
scientific knowledge, wage income, the net fertility rate, and individual human
capital. Our aim is to use long term data from the United Kingdom that reach
back before the Industrial Revolution. We choose the UK as a reference because
it is an important forerunner in both the Scientific Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution (Galor, 2005, 2011; Wootton, 2015; Mokyr, 2016). In addition, the
data coverage and the data quality for the UK both tend to be better over such
a long time horizon than for other countries.
We take the data on TFP from FRED (2017) that contains annual TFP
growth rates from 1761 onward and is based on Broadberry et al. (2015). Using
25-years averages to eliminate business-cycle fluctuations, we derive the change
in the level of TFP over time. We approximate basic scientific knowledge by
means of the annual number of cited references from 1651 onward (Bornmann
and Mutz, 2015).11 As explained in Section 2.4, basic scientific knowledge is
useful for applied research without, however, being patentable, i.e., it is non-
rival and non-excludable. We are well aware of the fact that the number of
citations is only a crude indicator for scientific activity but it is the best that we
have at our disposal. In addition, more citations would surely imply a higher rate
of knowledge diffusion and, thus, indicate a more intensive use of basic scientific
research in applied research.
Since we abstract from physical capital in the production process, a direct
indicator for economic development in terms of income growth is the wage per
worker. As a proxy for this wage rate in the UK, we refer to the real wage
of UK craftsmen during 1700–2000 as reported by Clark (2005). Given that
the majority of the population was low-skilled historically, this is arguably an
11The annual number of cited references is derived by analyzing the entire spectrum of
publications between 1980–2012. A comprehensive overview of scientific journal publishing
can be found in Ware and Mabe (2015).
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acceptable proxy.
In our model, fertility is the number of children per unisex adult. Choosing
fertility in the UK as a comparison would be misleading because of high rates of
child mortality, especially before the twentieth century (see Ko¨gel and Prskawetz,
2001; Doepke, 2005). We therefore combine the data set of Ajus and Lindgre
(2015) on fertility rates in the UK with the data set of Johansson et al. (2015) on
child mortality in the UK to calculate the net reproduction rate. The resulting
time series on the net reproduction rate per woman is then transformed into the
unisex net fertility rate as used in our model and it covers the period 1800–2000.
Finally, education and with it individual human capital is one of the main
driving forces of the transition to sustained economic growth. Thus, our sim-
ulation should match the corresponding data. We use the time series on mean
years of schooling in the UK from Madsen and Murtin (2017) and apply a Mincer
equation as in Hall and Jones (1999) and Prettner et al. (2013) to transform the
education data from 1700–2000 into units of human capital.12
4.2 Simulation results
For our simulation we have data covering up to 300 years. We choose the follow-
ing parameter values and initial conditions to match these data. The elasticity of
final output with respect to intermediates is set to α = 0.3, which is in line with
the literature (Jones, 1995; Acemoglu, 2009). Similar to Strulik et al. (2013),
the time costs for raising one child are 8%, i.e., ψ = 0.08. The yearly individual
discount rate is approximately 3%, which corresponds to a discount factor of
β = 0.3 over 40 years (Cropper et al., 2014). All other parameter values are set
to fit the data as precisely as possible. In so doing, we set ξ = 0.35, e¯ = 0.5,
θ = 0.23, η = 0.1, δ = 1.15, κ = 0.4, χ = 0.59, µ = 5.4, σ = 0.15, and λ = 1.13
The initial values for productivity, basic scientific knowledge, and the size of the
workforce are taken as A0 = 10, B0 = 10, and L0 = 1.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of TFP over time, with the data (dashed red
line) and the model results (solid blue line) being normalized to unity in 1820.
Broadly consistent with existing works, TFP is stagnant for decades until the
mid-nineteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution altered production pos-
12For further works on the relationship between education, human capital formation, and
economic growth, see Hanushek and Kimko (2000); Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a,b).
13Note that the intertemporal spillovers, χ, are substantially greater than the intersectoral
spillovers, σ. By that we avoid a situation in which basic scientific knowledge is the main driver
of economic progress.
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sibilities in a fundamental way (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011; Mokyr,
2005; Strulik et al., 2013). Not only does our TFP calibration match the onset
of the second Industrial Revolution, it also predicts the length and the magni-
tude of the takeoff as well as the phase of sustained economic growth from the
twentieth century onward reasonably well.
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Figure 1: Evolution of TFP (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red
line)
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Figure 2: Logarithm of the stock of basic scientific knowledge (model prediction:
solid blue line; data: dashed red line)
Which dynamics pave the way to sustained economic growth? Before the
onset of the Industrial Revolution, wage income is low. Accordingly, educational
investments are low, whereas the fertility rate is high. Productive R&D increases
with the stock of existing blueprints, with the stock of basic scientific knowledge,
and with the amount of human capital devoted to applied research. For early
stages of development, productivity and basic scientific knowledge are small,
as is the stock of aggregate human capital. Scientists in the applied research
sector are relatively unproductive, which is why the labor force is employed in
final goods production, leaving productivity stagnant. A growing population
and almost constant education slowly but gradually raise the aggregate stock of
human capital. Due to decreasing marginal productivity in the final goods sector
and a slow increase in the stock of basic scientific knowledge that comes with
the rise in the population size, productivity in the applied researcher sector rises
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and becomes high enough for researchers to be increasingly attracted into this
sector. This is the time when productivity levels start to rise slowly at first and
at a faster pace later.
Additional insights are obtained from Figure 2 by taking a closer look at the
role of basic scientific knowledge in the process towards the takeoff. While the
Industrial Revolution and with it productivity growth started around the turn of
the nineteenth century (Ashton, 1997), the takeoff in basic scientific discoveries
occurred about one century before. The increase in the growth rate of citations
is stronger in the data than the increase in the growth rate of basic scientific
knowledge in the model. The main reason is that in our model all basic scientific
discoveries are productive, i.e., they raise productivity in applied research imme-
diately. However, as we all tend to know only too well from personal experience,
not all scientific research is useful for applications. In particular, over time, basic
scientific research has broadened. While in the past, the share of research in the
natural sciences was comparatively high, it has decreased as other disciplines,
such as economics, have gained importance. Therefore, over time, the share of
scientific research that is useful for applied research might have decreased, which
could explain the gap between the model predictions and the data.
Wage income is depicted in Figure 3 and is also normalized to unity in 1820.
The value derived from the simulation is the available income per worker. As for
TFP, we predict the takeoff approximately right. The income gap that emerges
during the twentieth century can be attributed to the presence of skilled workers
and an associated increase in the skill premium (Acemoglu, 1998). Since our
model incorporates production workers as well as scientists, one would expect a
steeper increase in wages compared to craftsmen’s wages.
In Figure 4, the fertility rate in the model decreases over time and the
quantity-quality trade-off induces an even stronger decrease after the takeoff in
income growth. Comparing the model outcome to UK data, a similar trend can
be observed. Importantly, the fertility rate is high for low levels of development
and it decreases below replacement fertility at the end of the twentieth century.
The main differences between the series are due to changes in life expectancy over
time that our model does not capture. High mortality rates before the onset of
the demographic transition slowed down population growth in the UK and in
the rest of the world (Human Mortality Database, 2019). This negative pressure
on the population size is not present in our model because life expectancy is
assumed to be constant. Therefore, for the pre-industrialization area, the model
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Figure 3: Evolution of available income (model prediction: solid blue line; data:
dashed red line)
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Figure 4: Evolution of fertility (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed
red line)
fertility rate can be smaller than the fertility rate in the data.
Finally, inspecting Figure 5, individual human capital in the data and in the
model increase at the same rate until the Industrial Revolution, after which an
increase in the growth rate can be observed in the data that the model does not
match fully. One important reason is again the absence of differential skills, which
would induce higher investments in eduction of some parts of the population
(Acemoglu, 1998). Another reason for the discrepancy might be that the data
only reflect the quantity of schooling without controlling for quality, which our
model captures.
1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Year
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
In
di
vid
ua
l h
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l
Figure 5: Individual human capital (model prediction: solid blue line; data:
dashed red line)
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4.3 Comparative statics
So far we have shown the importance of the Scientific Revolution for long-run
economic growth from an analytical and from a numerical perspective. Exploit-
ing the model framework, it is now possible to better understand its implications
for the timing of the takeoff toward sustained long-run growth by employing a
comparative statics analysis. Changing the evolution of the stock of basic sci-
entific knowledge and its inclusion in applied research, we can analyze how a
different timing of scientific discoveries might have altered economic progress
and the timing of the takeoff.
In Figure 6, we show the evolution of wages given different assumptions on
the productivity of thinkers in the basic scientific research sector. With the
exception of κ and B0, all parameter values and initial values are as in Section
4.2. The baseline case of κ = 0.4 is displayed as the red line. By varying κ, basic
scientific knowledge accumulates at a different rate, which, in turn, affects the
productivity of scientists working in applied R&D and, thus, economic progress.
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Figure 6: Wages for different values of κ and initial levels of B0
Overall, the rate of economic growth increases with κ such that the takeoff to
long-run growth is steeper. The logic behind is that more basic scientific knowl-
edge is available, which makes applied research more profitable. By contrast, the
timing of the Industrial Revolution is postponed with a decrease of κ. In the
extreme case of κ = 0, B is constant over time at the initial value. In this case
the takeoff is postponed by one generation (as shown by the yellow line). Since
productivity of scientists in the applied research sector is determined not solely
by scientific knowledge but also by education, i.e., human capital, the economy
reaches the threshold at which applied research becomes profitable later. Even-
tually, better educated scientists are able to compensate the lack of growth in
basic scientific knowledge and the Industrial Revolution takes its course. While
a setback of one generation might seem little over the course of human history,
24
such a setback would imply that we had an income level today similar to the one
in 1980, which is substantially less.
Changing the intersectoral spillovers, σ, and keeping everything else constant,
also affects wages and follows a very similar logic. As obvious from Figure 7, the
timing of the takeoff crucially hinges on the degree of transmission of scientific
knowledge in applied knowledge production. For low spillovers, i.e., if the trans-
mission of scientific advances to the development of productive R&D is lower
(e.g., in case of poor knowledge diffusion or for cultural reasons), the takeoff in
wages occurs later. Again, the reason is that basic scientific knowledge increases
the productivity of applied researchers. If there is a fast rate of scientific discover-
ies but these discoveries are not considered in applied research, the productivity
in and profitability of developing new blueprints is low, which delays the takeoff.
These observations lead to the following remark.
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Figure 7: Wages for different values of σ
Remark 1. Basic scientific research and with it the Scientific Revolution play
a crucial role in the timing of the Industrial Revolution. A postponement of the
Scientific Revolution or a reduced transmission of basic scientific knowledge to
applied research would have delayed economic progress severely.
As discussed in Remark 1, growth in basic scientific knowledge is not necessary
for the economy to take off (as long as the level of B0 is positive) but a lack of
it can postpone the takeoff substantially. What happens if not only gB were
zero but also B0? Such a scenario is shown in Figure 6. The economy would
not take off at all because without any understanding of the natural laws and of
scientific inquiry, no productive R&D is possible, leaving the economy stagnant
indefinitely. We emphasize this in the following remark.
Remark 2. Scientific knowledge is indispensable for an economy to take off
because productive applied R&D requires scientists to have, at least, a basic un-
derstanding of the laws of nature and of scientific inquiry.
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5 Conclusions
We propose a novel Unified Growth model that sheds light on the role of the Sci-
entific Revolution in the process of the convergence toward a takeoff to sustained
economic growth. We show that the accumulation of basic scientific knowledge
(comprising knowledge about the laws of nature, knowledge about the scientific
method, and knowledge about the ways to disseminate ideas) and its application
in applied research is a crucial driver of economic progress in the long run. If
the stock of scientific knowledge does not grow or if the transmission of scientific
achievements to applied research is limited, the takeoff to sustained economic
growth will be delayed. This fits the historical evidence that over time British
endowment of science-based knowledge was growing, but only during the second
Industrial Revolution around the 1850s, this basic knowledge started to matter.
In the extreme case in which scientific inquiry is prevented altogether, e.g., for
religious reasons or by oppressive rulers, the takeoff to sustained growth might
be delayed indefinitely.
Our theory can explain why some countries and regions experienced the fer-
tility transition and the takeoff to modern economic growth much later than
others. For example, China was technologically more advanced than European
countries in the middle ages but then the Ming Dynasty decided to pursue iso-
lationist policies. Science did not progress as quickly as previously and China
was eventually overtaken by Europe, where the Industrial Revolution occurred
first. In fact China, which was among the richest countries in the world around
1000 AD became one of the poorest countries in the world in the midst of the
twentieth century (Morris, 2010). We believe that our proposed framework can
be helpful in understanding the reasons why this was the case.
As far as promising avenues for further research are concerned, a need exists
for better data on the calibration of the model for the time period 1500 onward.
Particularly helpful would be a database that allowed the quantification of major
scientific insights and major breakthroughs in applied knowledge creation over
that time period. Another interesting topic is to analyze the extent to which
institutions and knowledge interacted in the emergence of the Culture of Growth.
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